Privacy, Work and Prison from a reduced-libertarian perspective

Is prison a deterrent? It depends, especially if we consider the type of imprisonment and the type/background of the prisoner. If privacy and personal space are desired then 23 hours a day solitary confinement is not significantly worse than having to work 12 hours or more a day simply to stay fed and keep a roof over one’s head. While one has to work, almost all of one’s time is scientifically regulated while, although one cannot leave one’s cell, an individual in solitary is certainly free to think what he or she likes and is able to devote as much or as little time to whatever is in the cell or their heads. They may have access to books to aid in their rehabilitation or at least a television. The person working may be able to afford these things, but has much less time available to use them and much less privacy inside and often outside of work.

More importantly, imprisonment may offer an individual a great deal of freedom from the temptations and vices of the outside world (or, conversely you can do everything you want to inside prison as outside bar driving a car or interfering with a member of the opposite sex), or the threat of precarious accommodation or malnutrition. Once in the care of the state the state has to take care of you: once outside, you’re on your own.

If we subscribe to the dictionary definition of “libertarian” which emphases privacy in one’s home (what you do is your business so long as no-one else’s privacy etc is affected) then 1. To allow privacy, we have to allow everyone to have a home or some form of shelter and 2. Although this does not strictly follow, it is unjustifiable to force people, and especially prisoners in this case, to work. If privacy is valued, then the amount of privacy must surely also be valued. It then follows that we cannot justify a long working day with low wages: to justify working for another (being an individual or a corporate body) purely to feed oneself one has to enjoy more “privacy” or free time than the prisoner. This argument cannot justify, for example, the torture or starvation of prisoners. If you are in the care of another, they have to look after your needs or allow you the means to do so yourself, as to violate this is effectively a declaration of war invoking a state of nature: the prisoner cannot be expected not to defend or avenge themselves.